In many formerly democratic countries, the path to single-party rule has been long and winding. Georgia ruling party Georgian Dream (SG)it seems they chose the faster route. On November 6, prosecutors indicted eight opposition leaders, including the former president. Mikheil Saakashviliplanning to carry out a coup d’état. They could be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison. Six of them are already in prison. A week earlier, the SG had petitioned the Constitutional Court to outlaw Georgia’s three main opposition parties.
The cost of dissent is rising rapidly in Georgia, and it’s not just for politicians. Last month, police arrested dozens of people involved in anti-SG protests that began in late 2024, when the government decided to suspend accession talks with the European Union. Those who attempted to storm the presidential palace on October 4, the day of local elections, are accused of participating in a coup. Some people have been jailed simply for wearing masks or obstructing traffic. “Last year, the fine was 500 lari ($185),” said Inga, who took part in a protest outside parliament. “At that time it was 5,000 lari, but now it is 15 days in prison.”
It seems inevitable that opposition parties will be banned. The judiciary, including the Constitutional Court, is subordinate to the SG. Some believe the parties may try to reunite under new names. Salome Samadashviliaccording to Lelo, one of the parties facing closure, there are no illusions. “If we try to register as a new party, the Ministry of Justice will refuse,” he says. “With absolute control of the state, they can do whatever they want.”
founder Bidzina IvanishviliGeorgia’s wealthiest SG came to power in 2012, initially adhering to the pro-Western line set by his predecessors, especially Mr. Saakashvili. This came to fruition in 2023, when the EU, spurred by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, formally recognized Georgia as a candidate for membership. It had already approved Ukraine and Moldova, but Georgia’s approval was delayed due to questions about eligibility.
There were already frictions with Western countries and signs of democratic deterioration. Once a coalition of political parties, the SG had become a vehicle for Ivanishvili’s business interests and ambitions. Authorities began harassing LGBT groups as well as the Georgian Orthodox Church. Georgia has pledged not to help Russia evade Western sanctions, but has refused to impose its own sanctions.
Since the 2024 general election, fraud allegations have dramatically accelerated the process. Due to the opposition’s boycott of parliament, the SG gained complete control of the chamber. The “foreign agent” law, coupled with the termination of USAID-funded programs after USAID was disbanded by the Trump administration, devastated civil society. The opposition disappeared behind bars. Irakli KobakidzeThe prime minister severed ties with the EU and accused Western countries of trying to push Georgia into war with Russia. The EU concluded in a recent report that human rights violations are widespread and that systems of checks and balances have virtually disappeared.
Opposition parties are weak and divided, often plagued by a history of abuse and corruption during the regime. Local elections in October have reached a critical moment. Some opposition parties declared a boycott, others took part in the vote, and others urged their supporters to demonstrate. The result was an overwhelming victory for SG. “The campaign failed, the boycott failed, the revolution failed,” he says. dimitri tskitishviliFormer member of parliament.
EU candidate status was supposed to be an incentive for Georgia to pursue democratic reforms. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Analysts said Mr. Ivanishvili panicked because he felt his customer network was at risk. “He understood that if he passed all these reforms to the oligarchy, to the rule of law, to human rights, he would lose power,” said Cornelly Kakachia, director of the Georgia Political Research Institute, a think tank.
The sense of distance from Europe is closely related to increased dependence on Russia. Russia currently accounts for 45% of Georgia’s oil imports, up from 8% in 2012. In early October, a Georgian refinery on the Black Sea accepted a shipment of more than 100,000 tons of Russian crude oil for the first time. Georgia is also an important transit point for cars bound for Russia, according to a report by the Foreign Policy Center. Analysts say huge flows of undeclared funds from Russia are boosting Georgia’s economy (GDP grew by a staggering 9.4% last year). It can be dangerous to mention these issues in Tbilisi. Recent charges against Georgian rebels include providing information to foreign governments about the country’s economic ties with Russia.
SG leaders argue, with good reason, that Georgia cannot afford another conflict with Russia, which invaded the country in 2008 and still controls two large enclaves in the territory. Declares sanctions against Russia ‘suicidal’ for Georgia Levan MakashviliMember of Parliament of SG. “We have to be realistic,” he added. “We have to temper our expectations and discussions.”
On paper, the government remains committed to EU membership. But he believes it is possible under its own conditions, not Europe’s. The SG seems to believe that populist right-wing leaders will soon seize power across the EU and welcome Georgia with open arms.
Meanwhile, Georgia is looking for allies elsewhere. Mr. Kobakhidze recently traveled to China. (He called it “the world’s only peaceful superpower.”) To promote Georgia as a gateway to Europe and a destination for Chinese investment. The Georgia Democratic Party (GD) is also courting MAGA. this year, Kobakhidze has written at least two letters to Donald Trump.implored Georgia to lift sanctions imposed on it in 2024 and join the GD against the “Deep State” and the “World War Party”. Trump has not responded yet..
Critics have begun labeling GD a pro-Russian party. That’s misleading. For the party and its billionaire founder, making deals with Russia and China and abandoning European integration is necessary to protect their interests. “They are not guided by love for Russia,” Kakatia said. “This is a strategy for the survival of the regime.”
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