While most observers focus on trade wars, technology sanctions, and diplomacy, something deeper is happening. It is a resurgence of China’s geoeconomic strategy, which goes beyond factories and tariffs and anchors itself in structures of global connectivity.
With the approval of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), the Chinese government not only reaffirms its ambitions to lead in technology, but also launches a global offensive towards “connectography” – networks of infrastructure, links, capital flows and soft power, no longer limited to military geography, but capable of weaving the world together.
From the front, the United States appears to have its own network of alliances, supply chains, and technology agreements. Competition unfolds on a map of invisible connections.
What does the 15th Five Year Plan include and why is it important?
This document marks a new phase of industrial and technological modernization. Its most relevant axes include the prioritization of the modernization of production systems, technological autonomy as a strategic pillar, double circulation (internal and external markets), connection with the outside through selective opening, etc. By increasing its commitment to “new high-quality production factors,” China is also redesigning the physical and digital routes of global power.
Technological autonomy will turn into an instrument of sovereignty, with chips, semiconductors, advanced materials, and biotechnology becoming priority areas. And “external connections” include data cables, logistics nodes, ports, satellites, and emerging financial centers. The 15th Plan is more of a geopolitical roadmap than an economic plan.
Connectography as a battlefield
The term “connectography” (Parag Khanna, 2017) describes a world where power is no longer measured by borders but by networks. On the map, two major powers, China and the United States, are at odds over who will connect the world and how. China is making this visible through its Belt and Road Initiative, a network of physical and digital infrastructure across Asia, Africa and Latin America. The United States has responded with technology alliances (such as the Chip 4 Alliance and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment) and restrictions on the transfer of sensitive technology.
Each fiber optic cable, port, or rail route is part of a board. China is trying to build a closed and efficient system. The United States aims to keep global connectivity and governance standards open. This conflict is not territorial, but topological.
New markets become sites of conflict. Beijing will provide investment and technology in exchange for standards and value chain adjustments. Washington has proposed partnerships based on financing, energy and digital security. Both models aim to shape the economic structure of the Global South.
Factors between President Trump and Mr. Xi: The Busan meeting and its impact
The meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping confirmed that competition is no longer limited to just trade. The U.S. government agreed to lower tariffs and suspend sanctions on technology exports, while the Chinese government agreed to ease rare earth regulations, resume agricultural imports and cooperate on fentanyl regulations.
But what was important was the mutual recognition that the conflict was moving into areas of strategic connectivity: semiconductors, energy, undersea cables, artificial intelligence, and international finance. Connectography is being integrated as a new frontier of power.
As the Financial Times pointed out, “The real outcome of Busan is a tacit admission that the United States cannot isolate China, nor can China overwhelm the Western system. Both countries must coexist in a network that they are trying to redesign to their advantage.”
Impact on Argentina and Latin America
Competition between great powers brings opportunities for investment and technology transfer, as well as risks of dependence and loss of autonomy.
In this framework, Mr. Bessent’s statement was powerful. “We don’t want another failed or Chinese-led state in Latin America. Stabilizing Argentina is a priority for the United States.” This phrase reveals Washington’s strategic tone. It is not just economic aid, but geopolitical containment that seeks to reduce the Chinese government’s credibility and influence over infrastructure. Network diplomacy requires a foreign policy that can balance interests and prevent competition between China and the United States from shifting into technological or financial dependence.
conclusion
The 15th Five-Year Plan is not a bureaucratic document. It’s a statement of intent for how the Asian country will redraw the world in the coming decades.
The meeting between President Trump and Mr. Xi demonstrated that competition can coexist with interdependence, and that both countries seek to redesign rather than destroy global networks. In this context, Latin America faces the dilemma of whether to become a space of sovereign connections or a subordinate node in foreign networks.
For Argentina, the dilemma of deciding whether she wants to be an actor or a stage performer is even more pressing. Because in the 21st century, power is measured not by occupied territories, but by controlled networks. And those who master 21st century connectography will rule the future.
